Abstract Agents which perform inferences on the basis of unreliable information need an ability to revise their beliefs if they discover an inconsistency. Such a belief revision algorithm ideally should be rational, should respect any preference ordering over the agent's beliefs (removing less preferred beliefs where possible) and should be fast. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high complexity. In this paper, we consider belief revision for agents which reason in a simpler logic than full first-order logic, namely rule-based reasoners. We show that it is possible to define a contraction operation for rule-based reasoners, which we call McAllester contraction, which satisfies all the basic Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) postulates for contraction (apart from the recovery postulate) and at the same time can be computed in polynomial time. We prove a representation theorem for McAllester contraction with respect to the basic AGM postulates (minus recovery), and two additional postulates. We then show that our contraction operation removes a set of beliefs which is least preferred, with respect to a natural interpretation of preference. Finally, we show how McAllester contraction can be used to define a revision operation which is also polynomial time, and prove a representation theorem for the revision operation.
Introduction
One reason agents interact with other agents or their environment is to acquire new information. In general, it is impossible to ensure that such information will be consistent with the agent's current beliefs, and when an inconsistency is discovered the agent must revise its beliefs to restore consistency. We can identify a number of desiderata for such a revision operation. First, it should be theoretically well-motivated, in the sense of producing revisions which conform to a generally accepted set of postulates characterising rational belief revision. Secondly, when choosing among possible revisions, the agent should forgo beliefs which are less preferred, e.g., those which are less certain, credible or useful. Finally, the revision operation itself should be computationally efficient, since further interaction with the environment or other agents is precluded until revision is complete. However, while standard approaches to rational belief revision for classical reasoners allow preferences to be taken into account, they typically have quite high computational complexity, making them unsuitable for use when an agent is interacting with other agents or the environment in real time.
In this paper, we present an approach to rational belief revision which takes the agent's preferences regarding beliefs into account (reflecting e.g., how certain, credible or useful it considers a particular belief to be), and is at the same time efficient. We focus on rational belief revision for rule-based agents. Rule-based agents have a knowledge base consisting of rules (Horn clauses) and facts (ground literals). The facts used by an agent to draw inferences may come from a variety of sources (user input, communication with other agents, observations of the agent's environment, downloaded information from various web sources, etc.) and change over time, both as a result of the inference process itself and as a result of the addition and deletion of facts from the agent's knowledge base. In general, it is impossible to ensure that the agent's knowledge base is always consistent. Even if it is impossible to derive a fact and its negation from a consistent knowledge base using the agent's rules, there is always the possibility of, e.g., derived information being inconsistent with communicated or observed information. This makes a belief revision strategy necessary: the agent needs to have a way of removing enough facts from its knowledge base to make sure that a contradiction is no longer derivable. This paper extends work reported by Alechina et al. (2006a,b) . In (Alechina et al. 2006b ), a belief contraction algorithm for rule-based agents was described which runs in time linear in the size of the agent's knowledge base in the propositional case. It was also shown that the operation defined by the algorithm satisfies all but one of the basic Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) postulates. Alechina et al. (2006a) showed how this algorithm can be incorporated in the AgentSpeak agent programming language. In this paper, we give extensional definitions of the contraction and revision
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[124] Synthese (2008) 165:159-177 161 operations from (Alechina et al. 2006b ) and prove representation theorems for each operation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 2, we briefly survey the principal theories of belief change, and explain why rational belief change operations are generally assumed to apply only to idealised agents (i.e., are at least NP-hard). In Sect. 3 we introduce rule-based agents, and present a logic which characterises the 'deductive abilities' of a forward-chaining rule-based agent. In Sect. 4 we define the 'McAllester contraction' operation, and prove a representation theorem for it. In Sect. 5, we show that McAllester contraction can be computed in time polynomial in the size of the agent's belief set. We introduce a preference order based on the notion of quality of justifications for beliefs in Sect. 6, and show that McAllester contraction removes a set of literals which is least preferred. In Sect. 7 we show how to modify the definition of contraction so that it removes a minimal set of least preferred literals. In Sect. 8 we show how McAllester contraction can be used to define a revision operation which is also polynomial time, and prove a representation theorem for the revision operation. We briefly survey related work in Sect. 9, and conclude.
Approaches to belief revision
Two main approaches to belief revision have been proposed in the literature: AGM (Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson)-style belief revision as characterised by the AGM postulates and reason-maintenance style belief revision (Doyle 1977) .
Classical AGM-style belief revision describes an idealised reasoner with a potentially infinite set of beliefs closed under logical consequence. Revision is based on the ideas of coherence and informational economy, i.e., that the changes to the agent's belief state caused by a revision be as small as possible. In particular, if an agent has to give up a belief in A, it does not have to give up believing in things for which A was the sole justification, so long as they are consistent with its remaining beliefs. When new information becomes available, a reasoner must modify its belief set to incorporate it. The AGM theory defines three operators on a belief set K : expansion, contraction and revision. Expansion, denoted K + A, simply adds a new belief A to K and the resulting set is closed under logical consequence. Contraction, denoted by K . − A, removes a belief A from the belief set and modifies K so that it no longer entails A. Revision, denoted K . + A, is equivalent to expansion if A is consistent with the current belief set, otherwise it minimally modifies K to make it consistent with A, before adding A and closing under consequence. Contraction and revision cannot be defined uniquely, since in general there is no unique maximal set K ⊂ K which does not imply A. Instead, the set of 'rational' contraction and revision operators is characterised by the AGM postulates . The basic AGM postulates for contraction are:
[125] 
where Cn(K ) denotes closure of K under logical consequence. The basic postulates for revision are:
If the agent is a reasoner in classical logic, a revision operator . + can be defined in terms of contraction:
this is known as the Levi identity). Reason-maintenance style belief revision, on the other hand, is concerned with tracking dependencies between beliefs. Each belief has a set of justifications, and the reasons for holding a belief can be traced back through these justifications to a set of foundational beliefs. When a belief A must be given up, sufficient foundational beliefs have to be withdrawn to render A underivable. Moreover, if all the justifications for A are withdrawn, then A should no longer be held. A more detailed comparison of the two approaches can be found in, for example (Doyle 1992) . More recently, a number of approaches have been proposed which try to combine elements of AGM-style and reason maintenance-style revision; see, for example, cautious revision by Tennant (2006) and work by Dixon and Foo (1993) .
Most implementations of reason-maintenance style belief revision are logically incomplete, but tractable. For example, McAllester's boolean constraint propagation algorithm (McAllester 1990) does not find all the classical logical consequences of boolean formulas, sacrificing completeness for efficiency. The AGM theory, on the other hand, assumes that the set of beliefs is closed under logical consequence, and is therefore generally considered to apply only to idealised agents. To model practical (implementable) agents within the AGM framework, an approach called belief base revision has been proposed by Makinson (1985) , Nebel (1989) , Williams (1992) , Hansson (1993) and Rott (1998) , amongst others. A belief base is a finite representation of a belief set. Revision and contraction operations can be defined on belief bases instead of on logically closed belief sets. However the complexity of these operations ranges from NP-complete (full meet revision) to low in the polynomial hierarchy (computable using a polynomial number of calls to an NP oracle which checks satisfiability of a set of formulas) (Nebel 1994) . The reason for the high complexity is the need to check for classical consistency while performing the operations. Similarly, dependency-network contraction was shown to be NP-complete (Tennant 2003) .
One way to define an operation with a feasible complexity is to weaken the language and the logic of the agent so that the consistency check is no longer an expensive operation (as suggested by Nebel (1992) ). This is essentially what we do in this paper.
We present an approach to belief revision and contraction for rule-based agents which is a synthesis of AGM and reason-maintenance style belief revision. Our approach is tractable while at the same time being complete and rational with respect to the agent's logic.
Rules and corresponding logic
We assume that the agent's beliefs are represented in predicate logic, more precisely, in the form of literals and Horn clause rules. We fix a set of predicate symbols P, a set of variables X and a set of constants D. A literal A is a predicate symbol of n arguments followed by n variables or constants and possibly preceded by a negation symbol '¬'. Region(x, y), PartOf(y, z) → Region(x, z) Given a rule A 1 , . . . , A n → B, we define an instance of the rule as
where δ is some substitution function from the set of variables of the rule into D. We consider the agent's beliefs when the agent's rules have run to quiescence, i.e., after all the agent's rules have been applied to all the literals in the agent's memory. Note that this set is finite if the original set of rules and ground literals is finite.
The agent's beliefs are closed under logical consequence in a logic W which has a single inference rule, generalised modus ponens (GMP):
where δ is a substitution function which replaces all the free variables of A 1 , . . . , A n → B with constants. We will use to denote derivability in W and Cn closure under consequence in W . Note that W is much weaker than classical logic. The only new formulas which are derivable from a set of rules and ground literals are new ground literals. Another limitation is that from A → B and ¬A → B the agent cannot derive B (it cannot reason using the law of excluded middle). Also, B and ¬B do not entail arbitrary formulas.
As an example, assume that an agent has the rules
and facts
From these rules and facts, the agent can derive
To illustrate the need for such an agent to revise its beliefs, assume further that the agent is told that Chateau Lafite Rothschild Pauillac is a region of Tasmania
This new statement does not directly contradict the agent's beliefs, in the sense that the belief base does not contain a literal ¬Region(c, Tasmania). However it does lead to inconsistency, since it derives
which is inconsistent with F7. The agent now needs to revise its beliefs to restore consistency. It needs to contract either by Region(c, Australia) or by ¬Region(c, Australia).
McAllester contraction
In this section, we define a contraction operation for rule-based reasoners. In defining our contraction operation we have chosen to allow contraction only by literals, and not by rules. For many rule-based agents it is reasonable to suppose that the agent's rules are not open to revision: for example, if the rules constitute certain knowledge about the domain, e.g., ontological rules, or if they constitute its program and so cannot safely be revised. On the other hand, facts or literals may be acquired from multiple, perhaps unreliable sources, and as such are a possible source of inconsistencies. To model sources of belief, we assume that the agent prefers some beliefs to others. For example, it may trust communicated information (such as F8 in the example above) less than the information in its original knowledge base (such as F1). Those preferences are used to decide which beliefs to remove to restore consistency. To make the notion of preference precise, we assume that there is a preference order, , which is a total order on the set of ground literals. 3 For example, each literal A may be assigned a numerical degree of preference p(A), and
for two different literals A and B, we can use, for example, a lexicographic order to decide which one precedes the other in . For any finite set of ground literals , we denote by w( ) ('the weakest element of ') the element of which is minimal with respect to .
Let us denote the set of the agent's beliefs (rules and ground literals) by K . For two ground literals, δ(A) and δ(B), let us say that δ(B) depends on
This notion of dependence is different from entailment. In order for A K B to hold, A and B have to be in K , B should be derivable from K , A should be a literal which is actively involved in the derivation of B, and, in addition, it has to be involved as the weakest premise of some rule used in the derivation. 4
where ⊆ {C : C K A} and K \ A. The motivation behind this definition of contraction is simple: to contract by A, we need to 'destroy', by removing some premise, each rule instance which can be used to derive A, and we choose to remove those beliefs which are least preferred. 5 Note that since some rule instances may share premises, 'destroying' one rule instance may mean that another rule instance becomes destroyed, too, and it is not always necessary to remove all of {C : C K A} to make A underivable.
McAllester contractions can be characterised by the following set of postulates. 5 This is similar in spirit to safe contraction and kernel contraction (Hansson 1994 ) but does not involve considering all the kernels/inclusion-minimal subsets of K which imply A. It can also be shown to remove, in some cases, a different set of literals than any kernel contraction would remove. The following example demonstrates this. (2006)) and there have been a number of proposals for rational belief revision on finite bases which do not satisfy the recovery postulate (see, e.g., Makinson (1987); Hansson (1991) ).
Complexity
In this section, we show that McAllester contraction can be implemented so as to run in time polynomial in the size of its belief set (the set of literals in working memory and the set of the agent's rules).
Assume that the agent maintains a directed graph of beliefs and justifications for beliefs, corresponding to fired rule instances. Each justification consists of a belief and a support list containing premises of the rule used to derive this belief: for example, the justification of a belief B(c) derived using the rule Foundational (non-derived) beliefs have a justification with an empty support list, for example, (Region(c, Pauillac) , [ ]). In the graph, each justification has one outgoing edge to the belief it justifies, and an incoming edge from each belief in its support list. We assume that each support list s has a designated least preferred member w(s), which is accessible in constant time.
Algorithm 1 implements McAllester contraction by A. The algorithm consists of two main loops. The first loop removes all justifications which have an incoming edge from A. The second loop iterates through all justifications for A, and for each justification, either removes it (if it has an empty support), or recurses to contract [131] by the weakest member of the justification's support list, w(s). Note that the algorithm computes a deductively closed set by ensuring that justifications for each of the removed literals are destroyed. The algorithm runs in time O(kr + n), where r is the number of rule instances, k the maximal number of premises in a rule, and n the number of literals in K . The upper bound on the number of steps required to remove justifications corresponding to rule instances is r (k + 1) (one constant time operation for each premise and one for the conclusion of the rule instance). The last step in the contraction algorithm (removing a belief) is executed at most n times. Note that in the propositional case, when the number of rules equals the number of rule instances, the algorithm runs in time linear in the size of the agent's belief set (Alechina et al. 2006b ).
It is straightforward to modify algorithm 1 to perform reason-maintenance style contraction. Reason-maintenance contraction by A involves removing not only those justifications whose supports contain A, but also all beliefs which have no justifications whose supports do not contain A. In this case, in addition to removing the justifications where A is in the support list, we check to see if this leaves some literal with no incoming edges (no justifications for it). If so, we remove the literal and recurse forwards, following edges to the justifications in whose support list it appears. This adds another traversal of the graph, but the overall complexity remains O(kr + n).
Preferences
In this section, we give an example of a preference order on beliefs based on assigning degrees of preference to beliefs. Recall from Sect. 4 that, given a function p assigning numerical preferences to beliefs, we can define A B as p(A) < p(B); if p(A) = p(B) for two distinct literals A and B, we use, for example, lexicographic order to decide whether A B or vice versa.
We define preferences using a notion of quality associated with justifications. We assume that the quality of a justification is represented by non-negative integers in the range 0, . . . , m, where the value of 0 means lowest quality and m means highest quality. We assume that an agent associates an a priori quality with each non-inferential justification for its foundational beliefs. In our example, the justification (Region(c, Pauillac), [ ]) will have some number assigned to it, as will (Region(c, Tasmania), [ ]). The first justification may have a higher quality since it is part of the original knowledge base, while the second may have lower quality if it has been communicated by an unreliable source.
We take the preference of a literal A, p(A), to be that of its highest quality justification:
where j 0 , . . . , j n are all the justifications for A, and define the quality of an inferential justification to be that of the least preferred belief in its support:
Literals with no supports (as opposed to an empty support) are viewed as having an empty support of lowest quality. This is similar to ideas in argumentation theory: an argument is only as good as its weakest link, yet a conclusion is at least as good as the best argument for it. It is also related to Williams's (1995) partial entrenchment ranking, which assumes that the entrenchment of any sentence is the maximal quality of a set of sentences implying it, where the quality of a set is equal to the minimal entrenchment of its members. While this approach is intuitively appealing, nothing hangs on it and Theorem 1 holds for any total order over literals. For example, the preference of a derived literal could be a property of the rule used to derive it or given by some function of the preferences of its antecedents.
To perform a preferred contraction, we preface the contraction algorithm given in Sect. 5 with a step which computes the preference of each literal in K , and for each justification, finds the position of the least preferred member of its support list. An algorithm for computing preferences which runs in O(n log n + kr) is given in (Alechina et al. 2006b ).
A McAllester contraction based on the order of preference induced by the numerical values of preferences, minimises the preference value of the literals removed as a result of contraction. The following notion makes this precise. Define the worth of a set of literals as wor th( ) = max{ p(A) : A ∈ }. We can prove that McAllester contraction removes the set of literals with the least worth:
Proposition 1 If contraction of the set of literals in K by A results in the removal of the set of literals , then for any other set of literals such that K \ does not imply A, wor th( ) ≤ wor th( ).
Proof If A ∈ K , the statement is immediate since = ∅. Assume that A ∈ K . In this case, A ∈ and A ∈ (otherwise K \ and K \ would still derive A). It is also easy to see that A is the maximal element of , because a literal B is in if and only if either (1) p(B) = qual( j i ) for some justification j i for A, and since p(A) = max(qual( j 0 ), . . . , qual( j n )), p(B) ≤ p(A); or (2) B is the least preferred element of a support set for some literal A depends on, in which case its preference is less than or equal to the preference of the literal it is justification for, which in turn is less than or equal to p(A). So, since A is an element of both and , and A has the maximal preference in , then wor th( ) ≤ wor th( ).
[133] Proposition 1 tells us however that given the preference order defined in Sect. 6, the set of literals removed as a result of McAllester contraction is minimal in the following order on subsets of K 6
This means that the removed by McAllester contraction by A may contain some less preferred belief B which did not need to be removed to prevent the rederivation of A, i.e., K \ ( \ B) would not have derived A. However, any other set of literals which has to be removed in order to make A underivable will have to contain at least one belief which is at least as preferred as the most preferred belief removed by the McAllester contraction. It is possible to extend the algorithm for McAllester contraction so that the set of literals it removes both has least worth and is minimal, in the sense that no proper subset of this set would be sufficient for contraction. The complexity of the algorithm remains polynomial.
Definition 2 The minimal McAllester contraction of K by a literal
where is a subset of {C : C K A} which is minimal in the sense that for every
Algorithm 2 describes a polynomial-time procedure to compute the minimal McAllester contraction by A. 7 A representation theorem for a minimal McAllester contraction is very similar to Theorem 1, except that the minimality postulate (K . −F) in Theorem 1 must be replaced by the following strong minimality postulate:
Revision
In the previous sections we described contraction. Now let us consider revision, which is adding a new belief in a manner that does not result in an inconsistent set of beliefs.
Recall that a set of beliefs K is inconsistent if for some literal A, both A and ¬A are in K .
As noted in Sect. 2, if the agent is a reasoner in classical logic, revision is definable in terms of contraction and vice versa. Given a contraction operator . − which satisfies postulates (K .
can be defined via the Levi identity as
Conversely, if a revision operator satisfies (K .
, then contraction defined via the Harper identity as Gärdenfors (1988) . However, for an agent which is not a classical reasoner, contraction and revision are not necessarily inter-definable in this way. In particular, they are not inter-definable when the consistency of K + A is not equivalent to K ¬A. For a rule-based agent which reasons in the logic W , applying the Levi identity to McAllester contraction results in a revision operation which does not satisfy (K . +5). One of the reasons for this is that contracting the agent's belief set by ¬A does not make this set consistent with A, so (K . − ¬A) + A may be inconsistent. Instead, we define revision by A as (K + A) . − ⊥, that is, as expansion by A followed by elimination of all contradictions. 8 Algorithm 3 implements this revision operation. Note that we need to specify the order in which the contradictions are eliminated, for McAllister contraction is orderdependent. That is 
To see why this is so, consider the following example. Let
The declarative definition of the revision operation computed by algorithm 3 is as follows. Let (B 1 , ¬B 1 ), . . . , (B n , ¬B n ) be the list of all contradictions in K + A = Cn(K ∪ {A}), ordered by preference order on w(B i , ¬B i ), and let
Call this revision ordered contraction by contradictions (OCC).

Theorem 2 Each OCC revision satisfies the postulates (K .
+OCC) below and, conversely, if a revision operation satisfies the postulates, then it is an OCC revision. .
is inconsistent if, and only if, A is inconsistent.
This makes it is easy to prove by induction on n that we do indeed have a series of contraction operations applied to K + A. Namely, we partition into sets of literals i removed at stage i (if different contractions would remove some literal at different stages, we choose the latest stage to make sure that each successive set is deductively closed):
.
Hence, any operation satisfying (K .
does not hold. Suppose we add A to K and derive some literal B, but ¬B is already in K and has a higher preference value than B. Then we contract by B, which may well result in contraction by A. Another example of a situation in which (K . +2) is violated is revision by A in the presence of a rule A → ¬A.
One could question whether (K . +2) is a desirable property. For example, Galliers (1992) has argued that it would not be satisfied by an agent which performs autonomous belief revision. However, if we do want to define a belief revision operation which satisfies (K . +2), we need to ensure that: (1) A is preferred to all other facts in working memory; and (2) A on its own cannot be responsible for an inconsistency. One way to satisfy the first requirement is to use a preference order based on timestamps:
[137] more recent information is more preferred. To satisfy the second requirement, we may postulate that the agent's rules are not perverse. We call a set of rules R perverse if there is a literal A such that running R to quiescence on K = {A} ∪ R results in deriving a contradiction {B, ¬B} (including the possibility of deriving ¬A). This is equivalent to saying that no singleton set of literals is exceptional in the sense of Bezzazi et al. (1998) .
Analogously to the minimal McAllester contraction defined in Sect. 7 we can define a maximal revision by A operation, K . + m A, which retains a maximal set of literals consistent with A. To do this we replace the McAllester contraction in the definition of OCC by the minimal McAllester contraction.
Related work
The problem of characterising rational belief change has been intensively investigated, and there is a substantial literature. In this section, we give a brief overview of the work most closely related to our own, focusing specifically on resource-bounded revision and contraction.
Our contraction algorithm is inspired by the algorithm proposed by McAllester (1980) for eliminating inconsistencies resulting from boolean constraint propagation. He also used a notion of the certainty of a node, which is similar to our definition of preference. McAllester's algorithm was implicitly resource-bounded in that it was intended to form part of a practical AI system. However his reason maintenance system was designed to work with arbitrary boolean formulas, and was not logically complete. To the best of our knowledge, the relationship between the retraction, backtracking and refutation operations in (McAllester 1980) and AGM contraction and revision has not previously been investigated.
The use of preference or epistemic entrenchment orderings to define revision and contraction was proposed by Gärdenfors (1988) and Gärdenfors and Makinson (1988) , although the properties of entrenchment and the way in which entrenchment determines the result of contraction differs from that proposed in this paper. An anytime algorithm for computing a series of approximations of a new entrenchment order corresponding to a changed degree of belief in a given sentence (and hence the resulting new belief set) was proposed by Williams (1997) ; however even one iteration of this algorithm involves computing all minimal sets of sentences entailing the given sentence, and hence has a higher complexity then our revision algorithm.
Our approach to defining the preference order on beliefs is similar to the approach developed by Dixon (1993) , Dixon and Wobcke (1993) and Williams (1995) . Again, since they work with full classical logic, and calculating entrenchment of a sentence involves considering all possible derivations of this sentence, the complexity of their contraction and revision operations is at least exponential. Wasserman (2001) has proposed an approach to resource-bounded belief revision which has similar motivations to our work. Her approach is based on a compartmentalised belief base, defined by a prior notion of relevance between beliefs. Given a belief and a degree of relevance, there is a compartment of the belief base which contains the beliefs relevant to that degree, to the specified belief. A revision operation takes a formula and a degree of relevance and revises the beliefs in the corresponding compartment of the agent's belief set. The revision procedure itself is classical belief base revision; however, as the compartments of the belief base are typically much smaller than the entire belief base, revision of a compartment typically requires less computation than a revision of the entire base.
Wasserman's approach does not ensure that the belief set as a whole is consistent after revision; it ensures only that the compartment in question is consistent. The idea is that the agent is mainly interested in ensuring consistency between the beliefs that are relevant (to some degree) to the present task, rather than ensuring the consistency of its belief set as a whole. A similar approach is taken by Chopra et al. (2001) . They define a contraction operation which approximates a classical AGM contraction operation. Their contraction operation has complexity O(|K |·|A|·2 S ), where K is the knowledge base, A the formula to be contracted, and S is a set of 'relevant' atoms. As S gets larger, their contraction operation becomes a closer approximation of classical contraction. Our approach differs both from Wasserman's and from Chopra et al.'s in that it can be applied to ensure the consistency of large rule-based belief sets as a whole.
The complexity of Horn clause knowledge base belief revision was studied by Eiter and Gottlob (1996) but with respect to the consequence relation in classical logic. Perhaps the work most similar to ours is that of Bezzazi et al. (1998) . They also consider forward-chaining agents whose program consists of a set of literals and a set of rules. They propose several revision operators, some of which revise both the rules and the literals, and some of which revise only the literals, and consider which of the rationality postulates for belief revision or update (proposed by Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991) ) they satisfy. However, Bezzazi et al. are mostly concerned with belief revision operations which are minimal, which results in algorithms with high (exponential) complexity. The only polynomial-time operation they consider, ranked revision, makes sense only in the setting of default rules; for programs where rules do not have exceptions, ranked revision of a program P by a program P is P + P if P and P are consistent and P otherwise.
Conclusions
In this paper we have shown how rule-based agents can be modelled as reasoners in a logic with a single inference rule of generalised modus ponens. Their belief sets are deductively closed with respect to this rule; the closure of a finite set of sentences in this logic is still a finite set, thus reducing the difference between belief bases and theories for rule-based reasoners. We defined a contraction operation, McAllester contraction, for rule-based reasoners which revise only by facts, and showed that it satisfies all the basic Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson (AGM) postulates for contraction (apart from the recovery postulate) and at the same time can be computed in polynomial time. We proved a representation theorem for McAllester contraction with respect to the basic AGM postulates (minus recovery), and two additional postulates. We also showed how our contraction operation can be used to define a corresponding revision [139] 176 Synthese (2008) 165:159-177 operation which is also polynomial time, and proved a representation theorem for the revision operation.
